Tabloid Newsstands, or the futur antérieur Museum of Racism

One of the critical skills a historian of art, or indeed historian of anything, acquires is the ability to think cumulatively. This means assessing media and sources for their quotidian ongoing drip-feed effect, which, from the amnesiac day-to-day perspective of a precariously-employed member of the public pre-occupied with performance and meeting targets, comes to appear

Think Generically, Act Particularly

"Think

Yes, it's a twist on the old slogan 'think globally, act locally'. Bear with it, though; it means something related, but also quite different.

There is a certain degree of equivalence between a Badiouian Evental Site, the situation of mésentente in Rancière's 'part-of-no-part', Agamben's State of Exception, and, (perhaps least of all due to its apoliticity) a Lyotardian Differend. I do not know whether it was Balibar or Agamben who first noticed this. There is an excellent article on the subject of the Evental Site here.

It's sometimes startling to recall that Apartheid, slavery, and colonialism were all perfectly legal regimes. Even the Shoah was fully legislated for well in advance. In fact, a pre-occupying focus of genocide studies has been that the legal framework for acts of genocide always pre-exist the historical atrocities they legitimate, which constitutes in itself a formal, absolute, atrocity. Rancière is therefore far from merely sporting with language when he speaks of 'a wrong that is right': like Agamben, he is talking about situations of legally supported injustice. As leftists, whether we admit it or not, or whether or not it is explicit in our theoretisation, we are all dependent on a distinction between legality and justice. Without an idea or sense of justice, there can be no sense to revolutionary politics.

Just how generalizable this recognition is I do not know, but Badiou seems to have identified the formula under which the distinction is most visible: the Evental Site. Just as, for Agamben, the legal State of Exception (which defines the Homo Sacer) is both the gravest problem and the greatest hope, for Badiou the Evental Site is that place ('on the edge of the void') where organisation and true (revolutionary) political subjectification is possible.

With respect to Grenfell, for example, it is easy to see how the tragedy occurred, and difficult to see how things might have gone otherwise. Human voices were effectively put on mute; dissent from the dominant opinion was simply ignored or alleged not to exist; legal recourse was denied to residents; complaints were met with strong-arm threats and silencing strategies on the parts of the powerful. Here the structure of the situation is Evental: elements of the situation were on the edge of the void because they 'belonged' without being 'included'; they were always present but their political power considered from above was unaccounted-for, always rendered null in advance by dissuasion and threats.

Yet within this situation, in which human subjectification and the political representative link was denied to residents by those financially invested in keeping them quiet, residents formed their own collective and attempted to speak out. They attempted to give themselves a voice and make themselves known. One of these efforts was the Grenfell Action Group. When people in an Evental Site, denied voice, give themselves a voice, they are participating in revolutionary subjectification. Just as those denied human rights in detention camps around the world demanding due legal and political representation, refugees or workers deemed illegal, sans-papiers, or mere 'survivors', all contesting that they be acknowledged to be fully humanized and not pseudo-animal in status, so the residents of Grenfell were in the process of what Badiou regards as proper political subjectification, i.e. the formation of a subjective body of fidelity to a truth (in this case the truth would be something like: 'justice exists' or 'we have a right to rights'). This is far from a trivial theoretical observation. It means that, since truly public social housing has all but disappeared, the rentier and the private landlord being the ascendant figures of contemporary and near-future capitalism, and with coming generations unlikely to buy their homes, local bodies such as the Action Group are of extreme significance in our era. Perhaps even to the same extent that industrial workers' unions were in the time of bourgeois-owned factories (which constituted the Evental Sites of their times). This is all the more the case when the labourification (or monetisation) of everyday life is considered in closest scrutiny. It is not so much the worker, but the life-as-worker — the one whose ordinary living of their life constitutes an upwards revenue stream (via rents) — who constitutes the next historical subject.

Had the Grenfell community been able to reach the wider electorate, or perhaps federate with other similar communities without official voice, amplifying their own politically autochthonous voices, perhaps the tower fire might not have been inevitable. An Event was, at some point, perhaps possible. It is important that this failure is not regarded merely as the structural 'democratic deficit' of our neoliberal, democracy-abreviated times, but also at a much more grass-roots level a failure to rouse a wider context for concern, to federate, and to ally. A failure to see past the privatization of "issue" politics into groups of people concerned only with single issues affecting their members. A failure on the part of the left to regard "someone else's problems" as being a problem for all; a failure to think generic truths ('justice is a thing worth believing in', 'there is a right to have rights', etc…) in particular situations.

The Apparatus

"The

For Michel Foucault power is not a substance held by one person and not by another. Nor does it function in a 'top-down' manner as classically considered. With Foucault, power is decentralized, and operates through a distributed agency. Power functions through a range of relationships. For Foucault power is 'capillary',[1] 'cellular',[2] and 'exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.'[3]

Foucault defines 'techniques of the self' or 'arts of existence' as 'those reflective and voluntary practices by which men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make of their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria'.[4]

Foucault described traditional notions of the author as being restrictive. The author is a category or way of organising texts [the 'author function'] which has a history and needs to be challenged. For example, the psychological entity of the author and the use of the author as a way of organising texts are two different things and need to be treated separately.[5]

Foucault generally uses the term apparatus to indicate the various institutional, physical and administrative mechanisms and knowledge structures, which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social body. The original French term dispositif is rendered variously as 'dispositif', 'apparatus' and 'deployment' in English translations of Foucault's work.[5]

In the slim volume What is an Apparatus? (and other essays) Giorgio Agamben traces out several journeys that the critical idea of an apparatus must have travelled:

  • Oikonomia: a theological term, used already by the time of Clement of Alexandria, which merges with the previous term 'Providence'
  • Dispositio: from the Latin Fathers, another theological term
  • Positivité: Early Foucault (1960s), taken from Jean Hyppolite's work on the young Hegel (e.g. Hegel's Die Positivität der christliche Religion)
  • Dispositif: Later Foucault (1970s), usually translated 'apparatus' in English
  • Gestell: Martin Heidegger: 'the gathering together of the (in)stallation (Stelm) that (in)stalls man, this is to say, challenges him to expose the real in the mode of ordering (Bestelm)'

According to Agamben, '[w]hat is common to all these terms is that they refer back to this oikonomia, that is, to a set of practices, bodies of knowledge, measures, and institutions that aim to manage, govern, control, and orient – in a way that purports to be useful – the behaviors, gestures, and thoughts of human beings'.[6]

It is Agamben himself who claims continuity between his own use of the term 'apparatus' and Foucault's methodology:

The Latin term dispositio, from which the French term dispositif, or apparatus, derives, comes therefore to take on the complex semantic sphere of the theological oikonomia. The 'dispositifs' about which Foucault speaks are somehow linked to this theological legacy. They can be in some way traced back to the fracture that divides and, at the same time, articulates in God being and praxis, the nature or essence, on the one hand, and the operation through which He administers and governs the created world, on the other. The term "apparatus" designates that in which, and through which, one realizes a pure activity of governance devoid of any foundation in being. This is the reason why apparatuses must always imply a process of subjectiflcation, that is to say, they must produce their subject.[7]

While Foucault's modelling of the prison, clinic and confessional are by now well-known in terms of their architectonic power as apparatuses, Agamben extends Foucault's basic insights into their subject-producing effects to incorporate everything from mobile telephones to language itself, pitting this wholesale and incessant production of subjectivity against another 'great class' of things: the living being.

Further expanding the already large class of Foucauldian apparatuses, I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and-why not-language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses-one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face.

To recapitulate. we have then two great classes: living beings (or substances) and apparatuses. And, between these two, as a third class, subjects. I call a subject that which results from the relation and, so to speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and apparatuses. Naturally, the substances and the subjects, as in ancient metaphysics, seem to overlap, but not completely. In this sense, for example, the same individual, the same substance, can be the place of multiple processes of subjectification: the user of cellular phones, the web surfer, the writer of stories, the tango aficionado, the anti-globalization activist, and so on and so forth. The boundless growth of apparatuses in our time corresponds to the equally extreme proliferation in processes of subjectification. This may produce the impression that in our time, the category of subjectivity is wavering and losing its consistency; but what is at stake, to be precise, is not an erasure or an overcoming, but rather a dissemination that pushes to the extreme the masquerade that has always accompanied every personal identity.[8]

Somewhere in this extension of meaning, it is possible to lose sight of the more specific political meaning Louis Althusser gave to the apparatus, for example in his distinction between the repressive and ideological state apparatus. While Agamben's apparatuses are for him political in the sense of furnishing various philosophical anthropologies (which might be designated politics with a capital 'P' to indicate their ontological/Heideggerian nature), Althusser's apparatuses, together with their mode of subjectification ('interpellation'), are closer to Foucault's in being more localised within a specific (capitalist) history.

Althusser is generally regarded as avowedly attempting to expunge Hegelianism from theory. Yet even Althusser's residual historicisation, which remains after structuralism has reformatted his categories (indeed even Gramscian 'specific and concrete conjunctures within structural totalities'), leads after all to periodisation. So either the 'idealism' of Hegel — supposedly overcome by Marxist materialism — is something of a worm that snakes its way back in to theory whenever we consider the historical domains of apparatuses, or 'idealism' describes a different problem altogether. Is not the methodological and theoretical approach which considers artefacts as embedded in their social history both Hegelian-Idealist and Marxist-Materialist in this respect? Indeed, the very distinction seems a little pointless outside of pure ontology. History, whether conceived of as the self-development of geist or as the dialectically mutating ensemble of social relations and material practices, is regarded in both veins to be singularly determinate. Be it a top-down, bottom-up or even horizontal Spinozian-Deleuzian system of determination, it is the effervescence and mutability of history which determines the social 'place' in which the subject and its significance is produced. There is a certain positivity, historical normativity, social effectivity, symbolic efficacy, ethical substance, social objectivity, or let us just say 'institutional and/or cultural reality' to the place produced for a subject. All we really need bear in mind, in the interests of avoiding 'idealism' as an objection, is that history is a-teleological. This must be always borne in mind; for Althusser, and most contemporary Marxists, history is not a sequence of developments unfurling from some inner plan: history is, for materialists, aleatory. Thus, against the notion of some metaphysical gigantomachia waged between the forces of living substances and ruling languages, which is where Agamben feels to have left us, we are perhaps better to focus in on the specific and historical 'kludges' and always-being-hobbled-together apparatuses that our chance encounters with history throws up, rooted in the ongoing struggles between socially antagonistic parts of human society.

References

[1] Foucault 1980:96
[2] Foucault 1979:149
[3] Foucault 1990
[4] Foucault 1992:10-11
[5] O'Farrell 2007
[6] Agamben 2009:12
[7] Agamben 2009:11
[8] Agamben 2009:14-15

Bibliography

Agamben, G., 2009, What is an Apparatus? (and other essays), Stanford University Press
Foucault, M., 1979, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, Vintage Books, New York
Foucault, M., 1980, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon, Pantheon Books, New York
Foucault, M., 1990, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley, Vintage Books, New York
Foucault, M., 1992, The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality: Volume Two, trans. R. Hurley, Penguin, Middlesex
O'Farrell, C., 2007, 'Key Concepts' [online] available at < http://www.michel-foucault.com/concepts/ > accessed 18th Nov 2015