The Western philosophical tradition after Descartes firmly separates object and subject and in so doing ties these to the antinomy of necessity and freedom. Objects have nothing to do with subjectivity and are indifferent to its gaze, indeed impose necessary limits upon it; subjects meanwhile are not completely determined by limiting objective factors and therefore enjoy a degree of freedom / indeterminacy. However, these paradigms are far from aligning. There can be, and are, circumstances and phenomena better described by a subjective necessity or by an objective freedom. An example of the former would be the psychic limitations posed by primary repression or the Lacanian sujet barré, while examples of the latter are found in all those phenomena in which incompleteness, indeterminacy and ambiguity of form are ontological and irreducible to epistemological limitations (spin ice, quantum tunnelling, and so on). As such the sundering of subject and object, insofar as these represent the loci of freedom and necessity, is far from absolute.Continue reading “Notes on Philosophy of Praxis”
One of the critical skills a historian of art, or indeed historian of anything, acquires is the ability to think cumulatively. This means assessing media and sources for their quotidian ongoing drip-feed effect, which, from the amnesiac day-to-day perspective of a precariously-employed member of the public pre-occupied with performance and meeting targets, comes to appear furniture-like, ‘given’ and unremarkable. Only when viewed from a considerable historical or critical distance is it possible to see that what has been normalised, regularised, and routinised within a given period in the name of ‘representation’ is very far from being a true presentation of its social content.Continue reading “Tabloid Newsstands, or the futur antérieur Museum of Racism”
Yes, it’s a twist on the old slogan ‘think globally, act locally’. Bear with it, though; it means something related, but also quite different.
There is a certain degree of equivalence between a Badiouian Evental Site, the situation of mésentente in Rancière’s ‘part-of-no-part’, Agamben’s State of Exception, and, (perhaps least of all due to its apoliticity) a Lyotardian Differend. I do not know whether it was Balibar or Agamben who first noticed this. There is an excellent article on the subject of the Evental Site here.
It’s sometimes startling to recall that Apartheid, slavery, and colonialism were all perfectly legal regimes. Even the Shoah was fully legislated for well in advance. In fact, a pre-occupying focus of genocide studies has been that the legal framework for acts of genocide always pre-exist the historical atrocities they legitimate, which constitutes in itself a formal, absolute, atrocity. Rancière is therefore far from merely sporting with language when he speaks of ‘a wrong that is right’: like Agamben, he is talking about situations of legally supported injustice. As leftists, whether we admit it or not, or whether or not it is explicit in our theoretisation, we are all dependent on a distinction between legality and justice. Without an idea or sense of justice, there can be no sense to revolutionary politics.
For Michel Foucault power is not a substance held by one person and not by another. Nor does it function in a ‘top-down’ manner as classically considered. With Foucault, power is decentralized, and operates through a distributed agency. Power functions through a range of relationships. For Foucault power is ‘capillary’, ‘cellular’, and ‘exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.’