Notes on Philosophy of Praxis

The Western philosophical tradition after Descartes firmly separates object and subject and in so doing ties these to the antinomy of necessity and freedom. Objects have nothing to do with subjectivity and are indifferent to its gaze, indeed impose necessary limits upon it; subjects meanwhile are not completely determined by limiting objective factors and therefore enjoy a degree of freedom / indeterminacy. However, these paradigms are far from aligning. There can be, and are, circumstances and phenomena better described by a subjective necessity or by an objective freedom. An example of the former would be the psychic limitations posed by primary repression or the Lacanian sujet barré, while examples of the latter are found in all those phenomena in which incompleteness, indeterminacy and ambiguity of form are ontological and irreducible to epistemological limitations (spin ice, quantum tunnelling, and so on). As such the sundering of subject and object, insofar as these represent the loci of freedom and necessity, is far from absolute.

Continue reading “Notes on Philosophy of Praxis”